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Avi-Yonah and Fishbien:

DRAFT 11/20/17
ONCE MORE, WITH FEELING:
THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS” ACT AND THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF SUBPART F
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1
Nir Fishbien2
For the first time since 1913, Congress is considering abandoning the principle that
US residents should be subject to tax on all income “from whatever source derived.”3
Specifically, the proposed tax reform legislation, the so-called “Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act”, would completely exempt from US taxation dividends from “Controlled Foreign
Corporations” (CFCs).4 This is therefore a good occasion for considering the reasons
we tax such dividends in the first place.
When the modern income tax was adopted in 1913, it was clear that as a
jurisdictional matter the US could not tax non-residents on foreign source income.5
While US residents are subject to tax on all income “from whatever source derived”
under the provisions of IRC sections 1 and 11, in the case of non-residents, IRC
sections 2(d) and 11(b) limit the tax to US source income.6 That, plus the definition
of a US resident corporation as a corporation incorporated in the United States,
meant that the income tax did not apply to a foreign corporation earning foreign
source income even if it was 100% controlled by a single US shareholder.7
By the 1930s, it became clear that this situation was untenable, because
Congressional hearings revealed that wealthy US individuals used “incorporated
Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan.
S.J.D. candidate, the University of Michigan.
3 IRC section 61; US Constitution, Amendment XVI.
4 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, H.R. 1 (Nov. 2, 2017) (TRA17), section 4001.
5 This view has since been relaxed for foreign corporations controlled by US
residents. See Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 Tax L. Rev. 483
(2004).
6 IRC section 2(d): In the case of a nonresident alien individual, the taxes imposed by
sections 1 and 55 shall apply only as provided by section 871 or 877. IRC section
11(d): In the case of a foreign corporation, the taxes imposed by subsection (a) and
section 55 shall apply only as provided by section 882.
7 If we had adopted the UK definition of residence as where the corporation is
managed and controlled from, this situation would frequently have resulted in the
corporation being a US resident. This is still the best remedy against inversions,
especially if combined with a corporate exit tax to deter moving the headquarters.
There are no inversions in Europe because they adopted both measures. If we
abolish deferral as argued below, we need to adopt both of these defensive
measures.
1
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pocketbooks” in tax havens to accumulate income offshore and avoid US tax. In
some cases, they then gave up their US citizenship and moved abroad to enjoy the
accumulated income. Congress responded by enacting the Foreign Personal Holding
Company (FPHC) provisions (IRC 551 et seq.), which taxed the profits of a FPHC if it
had over 60% passive income and was controlled by five or fewer US individuals.8
However, Congress was careful not to violate the basic jurisdictional limitation by
taxing the FPHC directly (unlike its domestic cousin the Personal Holding Company,
which was subject to tax at the top individual rate but at the corporate level).
Instead, Congress invented the deemed dividend concept, under which the
controlling shareholder was deemed to receive a dividend from the FPHC and was
taxed on the dividend.9 This provision was upheld against a constitutional
challenge.10
In 1961, the Kennedy Administration proposed extending the deemed dividend rule
to all the income of CFCs operating in developed countries. The reasons cited by the
Administration included (a) capital export neutrality (CEN), a new concept invented
by economists in the 1950s; (b) the need to preserve the US balance of payment
position against too many dollars flowing out as foreign direct investment (FDI);
and (c) the need to protect the US corporate tax base from income shifting.11
Of these three reasons, the first is problematic and the second is obsolete. CEN is
problematic because in recent years many economists have raised doubts on its
importance in comparison to Capital Import Neutrality (CIN) or Capital Ownership
Neutrality (CON).12 The balance of payments issue is obsolete because since the US
abandoned the gold standard in 1971 it does not care about how many dollars are in
foreign hands because it can always print more.13
The FPHC regime was repealed in 2004 as redundant with PFICs (1986).
See Avi-Yonah, The Deemed Dividend Problem, 4 J. Taxation Global Transactions
33 (2004), also in Proceedings of the National Tax Assoc. Annual Meeting (2004).
10 Eder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 138 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1943).
11 See President Kennedy’s Tax Message to Congress, April 20, 1961,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8074, reprinted in part below.
12 See Hines, "Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income." Tax L. Rev. 62, no. 2
(2009): 269-98; Hines, Desai and Foley, "Taxation and Multinational Activity: New
Evidence, New Interpretations." Surv. Current Bus. 86, no. 2 (2006): 16-22.
13 In any event, the mere use of tax laws to address the balance of payments
problem was, to a certain extent, problematic, as more immediate and flexible tools
could have been more responsive to the problem: “From a more general standpoint,
various questions can be raised about the United States approach of considering the
tax laws from a balance of payments and foreign economic policy standpoint... More
immediate and flexible tools may be more responsive to policy needs. Thus, most of
the European countries, during the period when they experienced balance of
payments difficulties, resorted to direct controls such as capital and exchange
controls. The United States reluctance to resort to direct controls makes it necessary
to consider indirect tools, such as the tax Jaws, but the question can be asked
8
9
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This leaves the third reason: protecting the US corporate tax base from income
shifting. The first author has previously argued that this was the main impetus
behind the Kennedy Administration’s push to abolish deferral.14 This view can now
be supported by a remarkable report from the Stanley Surrey papers at Harvard
Law School.
This report is dated March 10, 1961, a little over a month before President
Kennedy’s tax message to Congress (April 20, 1961). It was forwarded to the new
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Stanley S. Surrey from IRS Commissioner
Mortimer Caplin. The report explains some of the problems encountered by the IRS
in the international arena, including “problems relating to the retention of foreign
profits abroad, including (a) accumulation of earnings by operating companies and
(b) accumulation of earnings by base companies in tax haven countries.” It then goes
on to explain why this was a problem:
The consensus of the task force is that under our basic philosophy of
taxation, United States taxpayers with foreign income should be taxed as
much as the United States taxpayer with similar domestic income for reasons
of equity among taxpayers and the prevention of tax avoidance. This
view is consistent with the idea that income taxes are imposed on a concept
of ability to pay and where income is received from any source, the ability to
pay is not different merely because the source of income may be from a
foreign area. … It is our view that the first objective should be an attempt to
achieve equality between the taxation of domestic and foreign income.
This is based on the thought that tax preferment, even for the most laudable
purposes, always gives rise to attempts on the part of some to avail
themselves of such preferment when their operations are without real
purpose. This automatically gives rise to questions of avoidance and evasion.
This in turn obviously makes the administrative job more difficult.15
The task force then goes on to recommend limits on deferral, namely “add new
section 951 et seq. to provide for a foreign personal holding company type tax on all
earnings and profits of a base company controlled by a small number of US
shareholders.”
whether other countries which have used direct controls do not have adequate
means to solve their problems so that it would not be necessary on economic
grounds to consider the tax laws in this respect”. See Stanford G. Ross, Report on the
United States Jurisdiction to Tax Foreign Income, 49b STUD. ON INT’L FISCAL L.
184, 217 (1964).
14 Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International
Taxation, 25 Virginia Tax Rev. 313 (2005).
15 Stanley Surrey papers, Harvard Law School library, box 175-2b (emphasis added).
The document is reproduced in part below.
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What is remarkable is that here there is no mention at all of either neutrality (of any
kind) or the balance of payments. Instead, the proposed Subpart F (with the correct
Code section) is based entirely on preventing income shifting.
We can now compare this to President Kennedy’s message to Congress on April 20,
1961:
III. TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INCOME
Changing economic conditions at home and abroad, the desire to achieve
greater equity in taxation, and the strains which have developed in our
balance of payments position in the last few years, compel us to examine
critically certain features of our tax system which, in conjunction with the tax
system of other countries, consistently favor United States private
investment abroad compared with investment in our own economy.
1. Elimination of tax deferral privileges in developed countries and "tax
haven" deferral privileges in all countries. Profits earned abroad by American
firms operating through foreign subsidiaries are, under present tax laws,
subject to United States tax only when they are returned to the parent
company in the form of dividends. In some cases, this tax deferral has made
possible indefinite postponement of the United States tax; and, in those
countries where income taxes are lower than in the United States, the ability
to defer the payment of U.S. tax by retaining income in the subsidiary
companies provides a tax advantage for companies operating through
overseas subsidiaries that is not available to companies operating
solely in the United States. Many American investors properly made use of
this deferral in the conduct of their foreign investment. Though changing
conditions now make continuance of the privilege undesirable, such change
of policy implies no criticism of the investors who so utilize this privilege.
The undesirability of continuing deferral is underscored where deferral has
served as a shelter for tax escape through the unjustifiable use of tax
havens such as Switzerland. Recently more and more enterprises
organized abroad by American firms have arranged their corporate
structures--aided by artificial arrangements between parent and subsidiary
regarding intercompany pricing, the transfer of patent licensing rights, the
shifting of management fees, and similar practices which maximize the
accumulation of profits in the tax haven--so as to exploit the multiplicity of
foreign tax systems and international agreements in order to reduce sharply
or eliminate completely their tax liabilities both at home and abroad.
To the extent that these tax havens and other tax deferral privileges result in
U.S. firms investing or locating abroad largely for tax reasons, the efficient
allocation of international resources is upset, the initial drain on our
already adverse balance of payments is never fully compensated, and
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profits are retained and reinvested abroad which would otherwise be
invested in the United States. Certainly since the postwar reconstruction of
Europe and Japan has been completed, there are no longer foreign policy
reasons for providing tax incentives for foreign investment in the
economically advanced countries.
If we are seeking to curb tax havens, if we recognize that the stimulus of tax
deferral is no longer needed for investment in the developed countries, and if
we are to emphasize investment in this country in order to stimulate our
economy and our plant modernization, as well as ease our balance of
payments deficit, we can no longer afford existing tax treatment of foreign
income.
I therefore recommend that legislation be adopted which would, after a twostep transitional period, tax each year American corporations on their
current share of the undistributed profits realized in that year by subsidiary
corporations organized in economically advanced countries. This current
taxation would also apply to individual shareholders of closely-held
corporations in those countries. Since income taxes paid abroad are properly
a credit against the United States income tax, this would subject the income
from such business activities to essentially the same tax rates as
business activities conducted in the United States. To permit firms to
adjust their operations to this change, I also recommend that this result be
achieved in equal steps over a two-year period, under which only one-half of
the profits would be affected during 1962. Where the foreign taxes paid have
been close to the U.S. rates, the impact of this change would be small.
This proposal will maintain United States investment in the developed
countries at the level justified by market forces. American enterprise abroad
will continue to compete with foreign firms. With their access to capital
markets at home and abroad, their advanced technical know-how, their
energy, resourcefulness and many other advantages, American firms will
continue to occupy their rightful place in the markets of the world. While the
rate of expansion of some American business operations abroad may be
reduced through the withdrawal of tax deferral such reduction would be
consistent with the efficient distribution of capital resources in the
world, our balance of payments needs, and fairness to competing firms
located in our own country.
At the same time, I recommend that tax deferral be continued for income
from investment in the developing economies. The free world has a strong
obligation to assist in the development of these economies, and private
investment has an important contribution to make. Continued income tax
deferral for these areas will be helpful in this respect. In addition, the
proposed elimination of income tax deferral on United States earnings in
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industrialized countries should enhance the relative attraction of investment
in the less developed countries.
On the other hand, I recommend elimination of the "tax haven" device
anywhere in the world, even in the underdeveloped countries, through the
elimination of tax deferral privileges for those forms of activities, such as
trading, licensing, insurance and others, that typically seek out tax haven
methods of operation. There is no valid reason to permit their remaining
untaxed regardless of the country in which they are located.16
Here we have all three reasons- CEN (“efficiency”), balance of payments, and
preventing income shifting/equity, with significant emphasis on the last one. This is
consistent with the task force report as well as a later memorandum by Surrey
(1962) we have published that agrees under pressure to limit the proposal just to
tax haven operations that facilitate income shifting from the US.17
However, when Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon came to present the proposal to
the House Ways and Means Committee on May 3, 1961, his statement emphasized
balance of payments and CEN, not anti-avoidance:
To avoid artificial encouragement to investment in other advanced countries
as compared with investment in the United States, we propose that American
corporations be fully taxed each year on their current share in the
undistributed profits realized by subsidiary corporations organized in
economically advanced countries…
While it is difficult to estimate quantitatively by how much tax deferral has
contributed to the balance of payments deficit, it has surely been a
significant factor…Today, our situation is such that we must look first to the
more immediate balance of payments results…It may be estimated,
although very roughly, that the elimination of the deferral privilege for
subsidiaries in advanced countries and for tax haven operations in all
countries would improve our balance of payments position by as much as
$390 million per annum…
While relief for the balance of payments is an important reason for
discontinuing tax deferral, it is not the only one. There exists, in addition, an
important issue of equity which has a significant bearing on domestic
employment and production…With the present deferral privilege, an
American firm contemplating a new investment and finding cost and market
conditions comparable at home and abroad is impelled toward the
investment opportunity overseas…
Kennedy Tax Message, supra (emphasis added).
Avi-Yonah, Territoriality and the Original Intent of Subpart F, 155 Tax Notes 1581
(June 12, 2017), 86 Tax Notes Int’l 1009 (June 12, 2017).
16
17
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It is sometimes contended that if US firms are to compete successfully abroad
they must enjoy as favorable a tax treatment as their foreign competitors. I
believe that this argument has been overly stressed…But even if this
argument were fully valid, it could not be a decisive objection to our
proposal. As long as the tax systems of various countries differ- and I venture
to predict that this will be the case for years to come- we must make a form
choice. Either we tax the foreign income of US companies at US tax rates and
credit income taxes paid abroad, thereby eliminating the tax factor in the US
investor’s choice between domestic and foreign investment; or we permit
foreign income to be taxed at the rates applicable abroad, thereby removing
the impact, if any, which tax rate differences may have on the competitive
position of the American investor abroad. Both types of neutrality cannot be
achieved at once. I believe that reasons of tax equity as well as reasons of
economic policy clearly dictate that in the case of investment in other
industrialized countries we should give priority to tax neutrality in the choice
between investment here and investment abroad.18
The National Foreign Trade Council, the lobbying arm of US-based multinationals
(NFTC) in its 1999 critique of Subpart F emphasizes this statement much more than
the President’s tax message, because Dillon argued for abolishing deferral almost
entirely in the name of balance of payments and economic neutrality considerations,
with preventing income shifting almost entirely absent.19 This was of course
convenient, because the NFTC could then present abolishing deferral as based
entirely on discredited or obsolete arguments.20 But the document we reproduced
President’s Tax Message along with Principal Statement…Submitted by Secretary
of the Treasury Douglas Dillon…Committee of Ways and Means, House of
Representatives (May 3, 1961) (emphasis added).
19 NFTC report, 1999: President Kennedy’s 1961 proposals reversed Treasury’s
previous reluctance to endorse current taxation of foreign income and explicitly
embraced capital export neutrality, due, in substantial part, to concerns with the U.S.
balance of payments situation at the time…When he introduced the Treasury’s
specific suggestions for ending deferral, Secretary Dillon framed his suggestions
largely in terms of capital export neutrality… The importance of capital export
neutrality as a motivation for the proposal emerged most clearly in Secretary
Dillon’s preemptive strike against those who he predicted would argue that the end
of deferral would undermine the competitive position of U.S. firms operating
abroad…
20 NFTC, 1999: By July 1961, the Treasury had retreated from its insistence on a
general anti-deferral regime. Treasury then offered a more modest proposal that
aimed to address only the use of tax havens. Treasury’s new position marked its
abandonment of a policy of capital export neutrality in U.S. international tax law and
also was the beginning of the transformation of the Kennedy proposals into “antiabuse” provisions…The major shift recommended by the Kennedy Administration,
to a general policy of capital export neutrality had been rejected…It is clear that
18
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above shows clearly that a policy of abolishing deferral could be based entirely
on anti-avoidance considerations, without the need to invoke either the
balance of payments or CEN.
The multinationals predictably objected in the name of competitiveness, and
Congress agreed, even though at the time US multinationals dominated the world

neither the House nor the Senate embraced the Kennedy Administration’s call to
shift U.S. international tax law to a policy of capital export neutrality. Instead, the
1962 legislation, as ultimately enacted, was targeted at eliminating certain “abuses”
permitted under prior law. The historical record, however, is far from clear about
exactly what the “abuses” were that Congress intended to curb…The lack of clarity
in the historical record of the 1962 Act about what constituted an abuse of tax
deferral in international transactions has resulted in ongoing debates about the
proper scope of subpart F that continue to this day. As subsequent chapters show,
legislation since 1962 has changed the rules for when current taxation is required,
but has not resolved the basic debate that raged in 1962. Moreover, interpretations
of the 1962 Act subsequent to its enactment have sometimes described as abusive
any transaction where a foreign government imposes lower tax than would be
imposed by the United States on the same transaction or income.65 This cannot be
right. In 1962, Congress clearly rejected making capital export neutrality the
linchpin of U.S. international tax policy. Attempting to force a strained interpretation
of the legislation it did enact into an endorsement of capital export neutrality by
defining anything that departs from capital export neutrality as an abuse flagrantly
disregards the historical record.
65 See Stanford G. Ross, Report on the United States Jurisdiction to Tax Foreign
Income, 49b STUD. ON INT’L FISCAL L. 184, 212 (1964).
Interestingly enough, Ross, in the same 1964 report cited by the NFTC, stated that
“[t]he United States 1962 legislation was primarily based on considerations of tax
equity and providing neutrality in the tax treatment of foreign investment. At the
same time, balance of payments and foreign economic policy objectives were in
accord with these bases for change and so reinforced the case for change to a more
equitable and neutral tax law in this area”. See Ross, Report on the United States
Jurisdiction to Tax Foreign Income, supra. It should also be noted that in the same
report, Ross argued that the principle of "tax neutrality" had three major roots. The
first of which was that “on grounds of equity, an American earning a dollar in
Europe should pay the same tax as an American earning a dollar here at home”. The
second of which was economic and balance of payments considerations and the
third was based on the ground of eliminating tax abuse “which undermined the
integrity of the tax system” (emphases added). This is near contemporaneous
evidence by a participant in the deliberations, and thus entitled to greater deference
than the NFTC Report.
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(18 of the top 20 MNEs were American).21 Thus we got the Subpart F compromise
under which passive income and base company income were taxed currently while
active income continued to enjoy deferral. The Administration agreed because in
1962 it was hard to earn active income in low tax jurisdictions, so allowing deferral
did not mean a strong incentive to shift.22
Subpart F operated more or less as intended until 1997, as shown by constant
pressure by the multinationals through 1997 to relax its terms, e.g., by (a)
abolishing IRC section 956A,23 (b) providing that a CFC cannot be a PFIC,24 (c)
introducing the active software royalties and active finance (banking and insurance)
exceptions.25 In 1999, the NFTC issued a blistering attack on Subpart F and
demanded abolishing the base company rule.26 However, “check the box” (adopted
in 1997) was already doing its destructive work in undermining Subpart F27, and by
2004, when the Republicans had control of the White House and both houses of
Congress, they passed legislation (the “American Jobs Creation Act”) that was a
Christmas tree laden with gifts for the multinationals without touching what
remained of Subpart F. Then, as a final blow, IRC section 954(c)(6) was enacted in
2006 to make it difficult for a future Democratic Administration to revoke check the
box.28
NFTC Report, 1999: “Competitiveness concerns were therefore central to the
debate when subpart F was enacted in 1962, even at a time when U.S.-based
companies dominated the international marketplace. In that year, 18 of the 20
largest companies in the world (ranked by sales) were headquartered in the United
States, but this apparent dominance did not convince Congress that the competitive
position of U.S. companies in international markets could be ignored. Thus, although
the Administration originally proposed the acceleration of U.S. taxation of most
foreign-affiliate income, that proposal was firmly rejected by Congress based largely
on concerns about its competitive impact.” On this report see Avi-Yonah, Tax
Competition and Multinational Competitiveness: The New Balance of Subpart F, 18
Tax Notes Int'l 1575 (April 19, 1999).
22 This is based on the statements of David Tillinghast reported in Avi-Yonah, U.S.
Notice 98-11 and the Logic of Subpart F: A Comparative Perspective, Tax Notes Int’l
(June 8, 1998).
23 IRC 956A, enacted in 1993 and repealed in 1996.
24 IRC 1297(d)(1) (1997).
25 IRC 543(a)(1)(C); IRC 954(h) (1997).
26 The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century
(1999).
27 See Notice 98-11 (January 16, 1998), explaining how Treasury realized how check
the box could be used to undermine Subpart F, and proposing to limit its application
in the international arena. For an evaluation, see Avi-Yonah, Notice 98-11, supra.
28 Which indeed they did not do when they had the majority in 2009-11. See AviYonah, President Obama’s international tax proposals could go further, Columbia
FDI Perspectives, No. 18, February 11, 2010. TRA17 would make IRC section
954(c)(6) permanent.
21
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So now we are in 2017, the GOP again controls the entire government, and tax
reform is on the table once more. The main focus has by now moved to the $2.6
trillion accumulated by the multinationals in low tax jurisdictions. The main goal of
the NFTC and its allies is to ensure that this immense pile can be repatriated without
too much tax (since they have mostly not taken a reserve against future tax on that
income) and that future earnings can likewise be repatriated tax-free. Hence the
proposal to overturn the “all income from whatever source derived” rule and
permanently exempt dividends from CFCs.29
As Surrey would have predicted, the evisceration of Subpart F by check the box and
954(c)(6) has led to an immense accumulation of profits in low tax jurisdictions.
Moreover, just as he was concerned would happen, most of this pile stems from IP
developed (with the costs of development deducted) in the United States. For
example, Apple’s $230 billion in Ireland stem from the sales of devices whose value
depends primarily on IP developed in Cupertino.30
What would happen if we adopt territoriality? The impetus to shift would be even
stronger, because there will no longer be any reason to worry about being able to
repatriate offshore profits. The resulting accumulations will dwarf even the $2.6
trillion, just like the $2.6 trillion dwarf the $300 billion repatriated in the 2004-5
amnesty.31
But, the Republicans say, what about the anti-profit shifting provisions in TRA17?
There are two major provisions. The first, section 4004, imposes a 14% tax on past
accumulations of cash or cash equivalents, and 7% on illiquid assets, payable over
eight years.
This is higher than some observers have expected, given that most MNEs do not
have a tax reserve for such payments on permanently invested income. However,
there are three reasons to doubt the efficacy of this provision. First, given that by
definition past accumulations have no impact on either efficiency or
competitiveness, the rate should have been higher (35% of $2.6 trillion is $910
billion, which would have offset much of the deficit increase from other provisions
of TRA 17). Second, because the multinationals were aware that this provision is
Avi-Yonah, Proposed Tax Plan Is Ripe for Abuse, The Century Foundation
(October 27, 2017), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/proposed-tax-plan-ripeabuse/
30 For Surrey’s original views see the document reproduced in Avi-Yonah,
Territoriality, supra.
31 On the 2004 amnesty see Avi-Yonah, The Silver Lining: The International Tax
Provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act—A Reconsideration, 59 IBFD Bulletin
27 (2005). Note that TRA17 keeps many of the current provisions that encourage
profit shifting such as IRC 954(c)(6) that is made permanent (section 4204) and the
active financing exception to Subpart F (section 4301).
29
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coming, they had ample opportunities to convert liquid to illiquid assets. Third, even
worse, the provision depends on accumulated E&P, and there are transactions that
can be used to “vaporize” E&P (e.g., IRC 304 transactions).
But this is just a transition issue. The main problem is the anti-shifting provision for
future income, section 4301. Under that section, if a US parent corporation has
“foreign high returns”, defined as the aggregate return of its CFCs that exceeds 7%
plus the Federal short term rate on the CFCs aggregate adjusted bases in
depreciable tangible property (the “trigger rate”), then it is subject to an immediate
inclusion of 50% of its foreign high returns, i.e., an effective tax rate of 10%,
regardless of whether the earnings are repatriated.
Once again there are several reasons to doubt the effectiveness of this provision as
an anti-shifting device. First, obviously 10% is better than 20% (the rate on
domestic US income), and given the availability of the dividend exemption, there
would be an incentive to shift profits in the knowledge that they can be repatriated
at any time. Second, current foreign tax credits are available to offset the 10% tax,
although only for 80% of foreign taxes paid, so there will be some double taxation.
Third, the trigger rate will shield some multinationals more than others. Ironically,
the more tangible assets you have offshore, the higher your trigger rate, so
companies like Apple or GE that actually make things offshore will do much better
than companies like Microsoft, Google or Amazon. This will be an inducement to
move jobs (not just profits) offshore.
Moreover, section 4301 will have another perverse effect- it will induce inversions.
If a company successfully inverts, it will not be subject to the foreign high return
inclusion, and will be able enjoy zero tax on those like under current law, as
opposed to up to 10%.
There are several inbound provisions in TRA17 that are supposed to deter
inversions. For example, under section 3301, net interest in excess of 30% of
EBITDA will not be deductible. This rule is necessary to prevent negative tax rates in
conjunction with expensing (section 3101) and the active foreign dividend
exemption (section 4001). But (a) some interest will still be deductible, and (b) even
though “no deductions for expenses properly allocable to an exempt
dividend…would be taken into account,” money is fungible, so that negative effective
tax rates can be expected.
Moreover, even though the interest allowance is lower than current IRC 163(j)
allows, it reduces the effective US tax rate from 20% to 14%, and so an inversion can
result in a US rate of 14 and a foreign rate of 0, instead of a US rate of 20 and a
foreign rate of 10 under 4301 without an inversion.
The other major inbound provisions are a limit on interest expense that does not
allow the US subsidiary to be leveraged more than 10% over the leverage of its
worldwide group (section 4302) and a new excise tax of 20% on deductible
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payments other than interest paid by a US corporation to a related foreign
corporation (section 4303). The first does little to limit interest expense since the
worldwide group can be leveraged as much as it wants. The excise tax can be
avoided if the related foreign corporation chooses to treat the payments as ECI
subject to 20% tax.
The excise tax certainly looks formidable on paper and is sure to enrage our treaty
partners, who will see it as an indirect way to impose a withholding tax on royalties
(contrary to article 12 of the tax treaties) as well as violating the arm’s length
standard of article 9 (because the excise tax applies to cost of goods sold between
related parties, implying that it is inflated, regardless of what unrelated parties
would have agreed upon).32 But the excise tax is also vulnerable to avoidance. Most
importantly, if the foreign corporation chooses to treat the payments as ECI, it gets
to deduct amounts “determined by reference to the profit margins reported on the
group’s consolidated financial statements for the relevant product line.” This
suggests deductions for royalties as well as cost of goods sold will continue with no
excise tax and no reference to arm’s length comparables (which frequently do not
exist).
In addition, the excise tax only applies to deductible payments to related parties. An
inverted multinational can sell as much as it wants directly to US customers or to
unrelated US distributors and it will avoid the excise tax. Therefore, inversions will
continue, and TRA17 does not have any of the anti-inversion provisions that
have been suggested (e.g., redefining corporate residence by location of
headquarters and imposing a corporate exit tax analogous to IRC 877A).
TRA17’s international provisions will therefore do little to prevent the kind of profit
shifting that Subpart F was enacted to prevent. We should go back to the original
intent of Subpart F and subject foreign income to the same rate as domestic
income.33 We do not care too much what that rate is, although we believe the
effective rate of our competitors is above 20% so 20% would preserve
competitiveness.34 But the absolute key is to have the same rate on all income,
domestic and foreign, because as the IRS task force wrote in 1961, “tax preferment,
even for the most laudable purposes, always gives rise to attempts on the part of
Query how the excise tax can be defended in the WTO. On its face, it would seem
to violate either GATT II:1(b) [as an unscheduled charge on importation that is not
an "ordinary customs duty"], or GATT III:2 [as a discriminatory internal tax, if it is
regarded as a tax on the internal sale to the subsidiary that just happens to be
collected at the border]. The interaction between TRA17 and tax treaties deserves a
separate paper.
33 This would, of course, take care of the lock out issue that animates the dividend
exemption proposal.
34 Avi-Yonah and Lahav, The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest US and EU
Multinationals, 65 Tax L Rev 375 (2012). We should also include anti-inversion
provisions as suggested above.
32

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/143

12

Avi-Yonah and Fishbien:

some to avail themselves of such preferment when their operations are without real
purpose. This automatically gives rise to questions of avoidance and evasion.”
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